Venezuela's Chavez Hangs On!
by Gregory Wilpert
Four Employer-led General Strikes and a Coup Attempt Later,
Venezuela's Chavez Hangs On.
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The OAS-Mediated Negotiations, the Strike, and other Recent Events:
César Gaviria, the General Secretary of the OAS, has the unenviable job of
mediating negotiations between Venezuela's government and its opposition,
while the political situation deteriorates and tension grows. Following a
full three weeks of negotiations, the two parties at the negotiating table
seem farther apart than when they first sat down at the negotiation table.
The negotiations were supposed to find solutions to three serious problems
in Venezuela: an end to the political crisis, via elections; a truth
commission to investigate who was responsible for what happened on the
April 11th to 13th coup attempt; and a plan for disarming Venezuela's
heavily armed population.
A number of factors, however, have prevented the negotiations from making
any progress. One factor seems to be Gaviria's inability to prevent the
negotiation partners from making statements or taking actions that would
have repercussions at the negotiation table. Daily press conferences after
each day of negotiations provided plenty of ammunition and obstacles for
advancing in the talks the next day. The opposition then began talking
about organizing a general strike for early December, which caused the
government negotiators to balk and say that they would be unwilling to
reach any agreements as long as the opposition tries to blackmail the
government with a strike. Next, it was the government's turn to throw a
wrench into the negotiations when it took control over the Caracas
metropolitan police-a force controlled by the mayor Alfredo Peņa, who is
one of the government's most vocal and strident opponents. Finally, the
opposition responded by making good on its threat and scheduled a general
strike for December 2nd.
While it is clear that these actions, both by the government and the
opposition have dead-locked the negotiations, it is not clear that any of
these actions were really necessary. That is, the Caracas metropolitan
police are feared by many Venezuelans, especially in the poor
neighborhoods, where many police units operate as little more than
legalized thugs, who regularly extort bribes from the people they are
supposed to protect. A complete overhaul of the police force was
definitely overdue. Also, since the police force was tightly under the
control of opposition mayor Peņa, many pro-government demonstrations were
met with police repression, often with many wounded from gunshots. A
factor that government supporters have not forgotten is that the police
were largely responsible for the over 50 deaths that occurred during the
coup attempt, from April 11th to 13th. The confrontation that led to the
central government's take-over of the police ended with three
demonstrators and bystanders killed by the police. While many in Caracas'
poor neighborhoods reacted with relief to the police take-over, the mostly
middle and upper class opposition argued that this was further proof that
Chavez aimed to set-up a totalitarian state in Venezuela. While the
take-over does seem to have merit, the timing could hardly be worse.
The take-over provided a perfect excuse for the opposition to call for the
fourth General Strike against the Chavez government that it had been
threatening with. Gaviria pleaded with the opposition in vain to at least
postpone the strike for a few more days, since he had just presented the
negotiating table with an eight-point plan that would hopefully resolve
the conflict, but the opposition ignored his plea. In response to this,
the government announced that it would no longer participate in the
negotiations for the duration of the strike and would organize popular
activities, such as a large Christmas market, to counter the effects of
the strike. Another activity the government has planned is a major
pro-government mobilization for December 8.
Monday, December 2nd, the strike planned jointly by the union federation
CTV, the chamber of commerce Fedecameras, and the opposition umbrella
group Coordinadora Democratica, took place, even though the internally
divided opposition could not quite agree on its duration or on its
ultimate objectives. The first day of the strike one could definitely
notice a decline of weekday activity on the streets of Caracas, especially
in the wealthier eastern part of the city, where almost all of the stores
were closed. The poorer western part of the city was also quieter than
usual, but by no means as quiet as the east. As for the rest of the
country, the opposition and government provided highly contradictory
information as to the success of the strike, but it seems clear that the
major industries were unaffected and that the rest were perhaps at 50% of
their normal activity. There were several incidents, however, where stores
in the eastern part of the city decided to remain open, but decided to
close because opposition demonstrators harassed the owners with
pot-banging and insults. The government ended up arresting three
individuals who were actively trying to prevent people from going to work,
for doing things such as slashing their tires or putting glue in store
locks, so they couldn't open their doors. The opposition's response to the
arrests was predictable, announcing that it would extend the strike for
another 24 hours.
The second strike day clearly enjoyed much less support, with traffic in
the poorer western part of the city being at nearly normal weekday levels
and in the eastern part at perhaps 50% normal. But much more important
than the strike were the protests that opposition members staged in front
of the state-owned oil company, PDVSA, in the afternoon. The government
had several months ago already declared the plaza in front of the company
headquarters to be a "security zone," since it represents one of the
country's most economically important installations, and had disallowed
any kind of demonstrations in this plaza. The national guard thus rapidly
and without forewarning dispersed the demonstration with the use of tear
gas and plastic bullets. This also lead to many journalists crying foul,
arguing that freedom of the press was being infringed, because they were
heavily affected by the national guard action. Once again, the
government's (over)reaction to the opposition's provocation led to the
opposition's announcement that it would prolong the strike for a third 24
hours.
For the third strike day, the opposition organized a demonstration march,
which went from the PDVSA headquarters to the hotel in which OAS General
Secretary Cesar Gaviria is staying and has the negotiations. [As of this
writing, Wednesday, 5:30pm, the demonstration took place without an
incident and the opposition is holding an undistrubed peaceful rally at
the PDVSA headquarters.]
Parallel to the negotiations and the general strike, another related
debate has been raging over the convocation of a consultative referendum.
On November 4th, the opposition had turned in over two million signatures,
calling for a "consultative" referendum on whether or not the president
should be asked to resign voluntarily. Venezuela's new constitution,
written mostly by Chavez supporters, allows for several kinds of
referenda, among them the consultative and the recall referendum. However,
a recall referendum is not allowed until halfway through an elected
official's term in office, which in Chavez' case would be in mid August
2003. Since the opposition wants to get rid of Chavez as soon as possible,
it has opted for the faster and easier route-easier because it requires
less signatures and less votes to succeed-of calling for a consultative
referendum.
The government argues that this consultative referendum asking the
president to resign is unconstitutional because it in effect amounts to a
recall referendum, which is organized by different principles than the
consultative referendum. However, the national electoral council, which
seems to sympathize with the opposition, has declared the referendum and
the signatures valid and scheduled a vote for February 2nd, 2003.
Meanwhile, the supreme court has intervened and ruled that the national
electoral commission is making illegal decisions because this five-member
body needs four votes to make binding decisions and the referendum was
approved with only a three vote majority. Then, on the second strike day,
the electoral council announced that it had now approved of the referendum
for February 2nd with a 4-1 vote. But the referendum also still has to
pass the test of constitutionality-a ruling that the supreme court has not
yet provided. Complicating matters further, the national assembly passed a
long overdue electoral law, which would name new members to the electoral
council. The opposition, however, has blocked this process by refusing to
participate in the naming of a commission, which would choose the new
members of the electoral council. The process is effectively blocked
because naming this commission requires the agreement of the opposition to
its composition.
Discourse and "reality"
Making sense of current events in Venezuela would be complicated enough,
were it not made even more difficult by the diametrically opposed
discourses that the government and the opposition use. If one only pays
attention to the mainstream private media outlets, which is what most
people tend to do, making sense of events is relatively easy, since these
provide nearly exclusively the simplified opposition interpretation of
events. According to the opposition, the Chavez government is a
"murderous, totalitarian, and terrorist regime." The country has become
"ungovernable" under Chavez because he has divided the country in a way
that it has never been divided before. Evidence for this division can be
found in that institutions such as the unions, employer associations,
local government associations, peasant worker associations, the military,
and the police, which are all divided into pro- and anti-Chavez factions.
According to many opposition spokespersons, especially Carlos Ortega, the
head of the opposition controlled union federation CTV, and Carlos
Fernandez, the new head of the main chamber of commerce Fedecameras (who
took the place of Pedro Carmona, the April coup-regime president for two
days), Chavez is leading the country towards "castro-communism." The
opposition sees evidence for "castro-communism" in the clashes between
demonstrators and national guard forces, in the supposedly armed and
violent Bolivarian circles that support the government, and in the
government take-over of the Caracas city police. Its own struggle against
the government the opposition portrays in heroic terms, comparing it to
the democratic revolutions of the late 80's in Eastern Europe and Gandhi's
struggle against the British.
In the opposition's (public) interpretation of government actions, Chavez
is consciously trying to create chaos, so that he can justify invoking
martial law, which would then allow him to completely transform Venezuela
into a totalitarian-communist society. However, before this happens, the
opposition pleads, the Organization of American States (OAS) and
Venezuela's neighbors (read: the USA) should intervene by invoking the OAS
democratic charter, which would impose sanctions on Venezuela until Chavez
is out of power. As its alternative program for Venezuela, the opposition,
that is, the CTV, Fedecameras, the "Coordinadora Democratica," which
unites all opposition parties and opposition NGOs, and dissident military
officers, signed a "democratic pact," which assures that one of the
opposition's most important projects is to reunite Venezuela and to fight
against poverty.
The interesting thing about the opposition's concern for poverty and the
poor, in whose name they often declare their opposition to the government,
is that all of their demonstrations take place in the capital city's
wealthiest neighborhoods. According to them, this is because the poor have
been tricked by Chavez into believing that he is helping them, making it
impossible for the opposition to demonstrate in the poor neighborhoods of
the city.
The government and its supporters have similarly colorful descriptions of
its opponents. According to them, the opposition is "putshist, fascist,
and terrorist." Government spokespersons argue that the general strike is
nothing more than a thinly veiled effort to repeat the April coup attempt.
They argue that the opposition is seeking as much chaos as possible, so
that either the government decrees martial law, which would lead to
another coup, or that the international community intervenes via OAS
sanctions. The fact that the president and others have declared that
martial law is nowhere near being contemplated should make this scenario
less likely. However, the government has claimed that it has evidence of
radical opposition group plans to assassinate moderate opposition leaders,
which could then be used to blame the government, in the hope of then
causing a general uprising. Many government officials are clearly and
honestly concerned that a second coup attempt is likely, even though
Chavez has purged the military of disloyal officers several times.
Given that members of the opposition have on many occasions issued calls
for the military and for the OAS to intervene, the government's
interpretation of events might not be all that far off the mark. However,
by making blanket statements that this is what "the" opposition wants, the
government loses points for credibility amongst the more moderate members
of the opposition. While it is true that the opposition is united in
seeking Chavez' removal from office, it is not united as to the means by
which this should happen. It is thus not fair to call all of the
opposition or even the general strike as a whole a repeated coup attempt.
The Media and Democratic Culture
The private mass media of Venezuela, by taking a strong protagonist role
in the conflict, is merely adding fuel to the fire. If the media were not
constantly amplifying the opposition's strident and distorted discourse,
that discourse would probably have little effect on the public. However,
the private media amplify opposition discourse by presenting about ten
times as many opposition statements than government statements, by
covering all opposition demonstrations and hardly any pro-government
demonstrations, by emphasizing events that favor the opposition, such as
the national guard crack-down on the demonstration in front of PDVSA, and
by ignoring events that harm the opposition, such as the threats to stores
that open during the strike. It is not far-fetched to estimate that
Chavez' popularity rating, which currently hovers around 30-35% according
to polls, would be at least 15-20% higher if the media took a more neutral
and objective approach in covering the news.
The opposition discourse, greatly amplified by the private media, amounts
to nothing less than psychological warfare. The population is made to
believe that Chavez is the only cause of all of Venezuela's problems and
that getting rid of Chavez will solve all of their problems. A more
differentiated approach and whether or not the opposition has a better
program or any program at all is irrelevant in this alternate reality that
the media has created.
Perhaps even more dangerous to Venezuela, is that the opposition and media
discourses willfully undermine democratic culture by arguing that it is
perfectly legitimate to remove a president as soon as his popularity
rating drops below 50%. As a result of this understanding of democracy,
the entire opposition and even a pro-government legislator were outraged
when Chavez said that he would not resign before his term was up, even if
his popularity rating dropped to 10% (he has said, though, that he would
leave if he lost a recall referendum). What is conveniently forgotten or
ignored is that terms of office were created for a reason and that as
important as the will of the people is, it is just as important to adhere
to the rules of the democratic game.
Prospects
In addition to the damage this conflict is doing to Venezuela's democratic
culture, it is also doing severe damage to Venezuela's economy. Every
general strike slows down oil production and shipping. Since a third of
Venezuela's GNP comes from oil, such a slow-down has nearly immediate
repercussions for the government's budget and its reliability as an oil
supplier. GNP, largely as a result of declining oil prices last year and
due to the first two general strikes, declined as much as 3.5% during the
first half of 2002. Although the price of oil recovered during the course
of 2002, the recent third and fourth general strikes, while not shutting
down oil production, will almost certainly be felt in government spending
for next year and in Venezuela's ability to attract future customers and
investors.
However, to make sense of the current conflict in Venezuela, it is not
useful to look merely at annual economic developments. Rather, one needs
to understand that Venezuela has experienced the largest decline in
average standard of living, as measured by a two-thirds decrease in
average real income, and the largest increase in poverty levels of any
country in Latin America over the past twenty years. President Chavez has
not really been able to prevent the continuation of these long term trends
during his now four years in office. All he has been able to do is to slow
it down (during his second and third year in office GNP increased
slightly) and to distribute the decline more evenly among the population
by focusing state resources on the poorer sectors of the population
through large increases in spending on education, health, and housing and
through large-scale rural and urban land redistribution and micro-credit
programs. Also, despite what the opposition says about Chavez' supposed
lack of democratic credentials, Venezuela now has one of Latin America's
most democratic constitutions, thanks to Chavez' movement-one which allows
for popular referenda, for recall votes, and for minority rights, among
many other innovations.
One way to interpret this conflict is to see it as a battle over a
shrinking pie, a battle which becomes ever more heated as the pie becomes
smaller. The Chavez government has attempted to develop an economic
program which would diversify the economy and end Venezuela's deadly
dependency on oil, but any such program would have to be long-term and
thus cannot help resolve the conflicts of the shrinking economy in the
short term. In effect, Venezuela has to figure out a way to resolve both
the long term problem of the shrinking economy and the short term problem
of how to distribute the losses, without resorting to civil war. But with
diametrically opposed discourses and with practically no political leader
and certainly no political groups seeking out a more differentiated
approach, there is little hope that the conflict will subside any time
soon.
Pointing to Venezuela's internal divisions and blaming Chavez for them is
a bit disingenuous, since resource conflicts, which is at the heart of
Venezuela's current problems, are bound to lead to bitter turf battles.
Everyone, both pro- and anti- government, says they want a united and
peaceful Venezuela in which conflicts are resolved through dialogue.
However, both sides seem to lack a real vision for how this could be
achieved. A start might be a very strict adherence to democratic rules and
principles and a complete honesty as to when this is the case and when
not, no matter whose side one is on.
– Gregory Wilpert
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CIA World Factbook:
Venezuela was one of the three countries that emerged from the collapse of Gran Colombia in 1830 (the others being Colombia and Ecuador). For most of the first half of the 20th century, Venezuela was ruled by generally benevolent military strongmen, who promoted the oil industry and allowed for some social reforms. Democratically-elected governments have held sway since 1959. Current concerns include: an embattled president who is losing his once solid support among Venezuelans, a divided military, drug-related conflicts along the Colombian border, increasing internal drug consumption, overdependence on the petroleum industry with its price fluctuations, and irresponsible mining operations that are endangering the rain forest and indigenous peoples.
chief of state: President Hugo CHAVEZ Frias (since 3 February 1999); Vice President Jose Vicente RANGEL (since 28 April 2002); note - the president is both the chief of state and head of government
head of government: President Hugo CHAVEZ Frias (since 3 February 1999); Vice President Jose Vicente RANGEL (since 28 April 2002); note - the president is both the chief of state and head of government
cabinet: Council of Ministers appointed by the president
election results: Hugo CHAVEZ Frias reelected president; percent of vote - 60%
elections: president elected by popular vote for a six-year term; election last held 30 July 2000 (next to be held NA 2006)
The petroleum sector dominates the economy, accounting for roughly a third of GDP, around 80% of export earnings, and more than half of government operating revenues. Venezuelan officials estimate that GDP grew by 2.7% in 2001. A strong rebound in international oil prices fueled the recovery from the steep recession in 1999. Nevertheless, a weak nonoil sector and capital flight - and a temporary fall in oil prices - undercut the recovery. In early 2002, President CHAVEZ changed the exchange rate regime from a crawling peg to a free floating exchange rate, causing the bolivar to depreciate significantly.
Disputes: claims all of Guyana west of the Essequibo (river); maritime boundary dispute with Colombia in the Gulf of Venezuela; several Caribbean states protest Venezuela's claim to Islas des Aves (Bird Islands), 565 km from Venezuelan mainland.
Small-scale illicit producer of opium and coca for the processing of opiates and coca derivatives; however, large quantities of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana transit the country from Colombia bound for US and Europe; important money-laundering center; active eradication program primarily targeting opium; increasing signs of drug-related activities by Colombian insurgents on border
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