Preface 2002: The Political Economy of "the War on Terrorism"
I wrote this essay in March 1998 during the last major political-military confrontation of the US
government with the Baathist regime of Iraq. It might be useful to review it now when the Bush
Administration is preparing for an attack on Iraq to bring about a "regime change."
In it is an analysis of the political economic thinking that is at the basis of Bushes "war on terrorism" (Stage 2: The Axis of Evil). The key argument of this doctrine is very simple:
- Almost any advanced technological production process can be used to create "weapons of mass
destruction."
- Any such production process not directly controlled by a multinational corporation (MNC)
headquartered in the US (or Japan or Western Europe) can be used by a government to create weapons of
mass destruction
- No goverment outside a list agreed upon by the US government ought to have the capacity to
build weapons of mass destruction
Hence, No government (whether democratically elected or not) outside of the agreed list whose
advanced technology is not controlled by an acceptable MNC can not be allowed to exist.
This argument means that the US government has taken on the role of overseeing and vetoing all
forms of industrial development throughout the world in perpetuum. Autonomous industrial development
not controlled by an approved MNC by any government is out of order. Hence this "war on terrorism"
doctrine becomes a basis for the military control of economic development policies of any
government on the planet.
The consequences of such a doctrine are, of course, enormous. It shows us that the struggle now
unfolding in Iraq is not only about oil. What is at stake is the shape of planetary industrial
development for decades to come.
Introduction:
Barely seven years after a major military attack that left Iraqi industry, hospitals, water and
sewage treatment plants devastated, and caused thousands of civilian casualties as well as
widespread sickness among American soldiers, the United States government prepared to go to war again
against Iraq in February 1998. The Clinton administration's reasons for initiating this war - although
noticeably shifting as the weeks went by - were clothed in a dramatic language. "... [I]t is very
important for us to make clear," said Secretary of State Albright in a Columbus, Ohio 'town hall
meeting' on February 19, 1998, "that the United States and the civilized world cannot deal with
somebody who is willing to use ... weapons of mass destruction on his own people, not to speak of his
neighbors." In the same meeting, Albright reiterated: "What we are concerned about is Saddam
Hussein, who has a record of using weapons of mass destruction against his neighbors as well as against
his own people. And [he is] a brutal dictator who is terrifying his people and threatening the
region ... our policy is to contain him; that is what we are trying to do." (NYT 2/19/98: A9)
The key words used to justify the US policy were "weapons of mass destruction" and "tyrannical
rule" [1]. The US war aims, according to Clinton, were to undermine the Iraqi government and to
"substantially reduce or delay" its ability to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction (NYT
2/13/98: A1). The commander of US forces in the Persian Gulf, General Zinni, explained that he
intended to meet these aims by destroying "the things that obviously allow [Saddam Hussein] to stay in
power, threaten his neighbors, threaten the use of weapons of mass destruction, the things that are
involved in the control of those sorts of assets." (NYT 2/12/98: A6)
Such justifications, however, were generally unconvincing, as the audience in the famous Columbus
town hall meeting demonstrated. Their questions and the answers they received showed that the
Clinton Administration was far from transparent about its true war aims. As one audience member said:
"The are many countries that have these biological and chemical weapons - six countries in the
Middle East alone. You've stated why Saddam Hussein should be singled out, but it is puzzling to
people to wonder why it's O.K. for these other countries to have biological and chemical weapons."
Another audience member asked Secretary of Defense Cohen "if he thinks that the ultimate goal of this
particular action ... should be the ultimate removal of Saddam Hussein from Government." Cohen
replied that the removal of Hussein "would require ... a rather massive force of land forces, and we
don't think that it's necessary in order to contain him. We think that we can contain him, as we
have for the past seven years, and allow the Iraqi people at some point in time to determine for
themselves whether they want another seven years of deprivation." (NYT 2/19/98: A9) In other words,
Secretary Cohen committed himself to the "containment" of Saddam Hussein while General Zinni is
out to destroy his power.
The Columbus town hall meeting gave voice to a pervasive sense growing throughout the country and
the world that the Clinton Administration was hiding something. Was the movie Wag the Dog right?
Was the threatened war nothing but a diversion from a sordid sex scandal, or was there an another
explanation? Clinton Administration officials stuck to their cover story through thick and thin
simply because, however shaky it may have appeared, it put the opponents to the war on the defensive.
After all, who wanted to defend secret weapons of mass destruction or a tyrannical regime? What I
offer in this article is a different explanation as to why the US insisted on waging war against
Iraq along with some reasons why people in the US should oppose this war.
Alternative explanations are necessary as probes to challenge and deflate the ever present threats
of war. For even though the agreement between Kofi Annan, the UN General Secretary, and the Iraqi
government seems to have averted the immediate threat of war, there is very good reason to believe
that the US government will be vitally interested in the fomenting similar episodes in the future.
This strategy of tension can delay the lifting of the sanctions that restrict the sale of Iraqi
oil for years. So we should be ready with our best arguments, since they might have to be deployed
quite soon.
Moreover, one of the main arguments of anti-war opponents - a war would cause the loss of innocent
Iraqi lives - is morally valid, but politically weak. Its moral validity is obvious. As we know,
the combined effects of the aerial bombardments and the sanctions imposed on Iraq, that restricted
the import of food and medicine, have been responsible for the death of hundreds of thousands of
Iraqi people, most of them children.[2] And we can easily imagine that a bombing campaign of the
sort described by General Zinni would produce a carnage and a devastation of incommensurable
proportions.
Unfortunately, these types of considerations have never moved the US population to seriously try
to stop its government from engaging in the use of mass bombing, except in the case of Vietnam.
Moreover, once a war is started, military decisions are not in the people's hands. But if we cannot
appeal to the hearts of the US people, then we should speak to their self-interest, showing how the
war on Iraq is connected to a set of larger issues that do affect the US working class and call
for our resistance to the war.
To explain the US government's decision to threaten an attack on Iraq we must go beyond the
official reasons offered to justify this course of action, and look at the short and long-term material
interests the US government has in the region, and at the role Iraq plays in the international
division of oil and gas production. If we do that, we also see that the attack on Iraq fits with the
politics of Globalization, as demonstrated by the position the US/UN has taken in many other world
regions and conjunctures as, for example, the Asian crisis.
Official Issues and the Fine Print:
At the end of the Gulf War, a series of agreements were concluded between the Iraqi government and
the United Nations. One of the most controversial was the right of the United Nations to search
for and destroy any "weapons of mass destruction" that the Iraqi state would produce. The "UN Special Commission" on Iraq ("UNSCOM") is the name of the UN inspection team in charge of the
search-and-destroy mission; its present head is Richard Butler, a former Australian ambassador to Indonesia.
Once UNSCOM completes its work, the sanctions will, presumably, be lifted.
The Clinton Administration justified its threatened bombing of Iraq by claiming that the Iraqi
government has violated this agreement. Was this true? Immediately before the Secretary General Kofi
Annan's arrival in Baghdad in February 21, 1998, there appeared to be two interpretations of what
complying with the original agreements meant.
- The Iraqis agreed to give the UNSCOM inspectors access to eight presidential sites - areas
containing many buildings including residences belonging to Saddam Hussein - for the duration of 60
days, and they have also agreed to have the inspection team report directly to the UN Secretary
General rather than to Mr. Butler
- The US asserted that the UNSCOM inspectors "must be free to do their work without hindrance,
without conditions, and without time limits" and they must continue to report to Mr. Butler. (NYT
2/17/98: A6)
The issue, then, as stated, was not whether the inspections should go on, but how they should be
conducted. The Iraqi authorities were demanding that the accords be put in specific terms (specific
times, places and persons), while the US demanded a general reading of the accords. In other
words, the confrontation seemed to be between the position of Iraq, that accepts eight sites and sixty
days, and that of the US, that demands inspection at any place-any time.
The Iraqi government's insistence on specific terms in the interpretation of the accords came from
its desire to maintain at least a shred of sovereignty. It wanted the terms of the accord to be
open to negotiation at each turn in the story and the story itself to have a temporal limit that
would lead to the end of sanctions.
The US government, on the other hand, claims the right to carry on an absolute surveillance over
the entire Iraqi territory, for an indefinite span of time, and wants the absolute right to control
and destroy any possible means that might lead to the development of weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery. This demand is tantamount to requiring that the Iraqi nation become a
pre-industrial colony producing crude oil, at best. For, as we have learned from the ecological movement,
almost any industrial development is either a potential weapon of mass destruction, or allows for
the development of such weapons. For example, any petro-chemical industry makes chemical weapons
possible; any aero-space industry makes delivery vehicles possible; any bio-engineering or
pharmaceutical industry makes biological weapons possible. What the US is, in fact, demanding is the
elimination not only of Iraqi sovereignty but the total control over of its future industrial
development, if not the total destruction of its industrial capacity.
The seemingly formal issue concerning the interpretation of the accords hid a much more
substantial one: whether the ruling Baathist government will accept Iraq's return to a colonial, dependent
status. This definitely was what international jurists used to call a casus belli.
The crisis was averted when Iraqi government decided to accept an interpretation of the accords
brought by Kofi Annan to Baghdad on February 23, 1998. This interpretation seemed to be an adequate
diplomatic "splitting of the difference" for the moment. It lifted the sixty day limit on
inspections, but kept the reference to the eight sites. Similarly, it included a gesture to the
recognition of Iraqi sovereignty by adding a group of senior diplomats to the UNSCOM "technical" team - whose members were arrogant and disrespectful, according to Iraqi officials - that will inspect the presidential sites. Finally, the document's references to the "legitimate concerns of Iraq relating to national security, sovereignty and dignity" and the "lifting of sanctions" seemed enough to assuage the Iraqi government. (NYT 2/24/98) But the fundamental issue between the US and the Iraqi
regimes concerning the political sovereignty and economic independence of Iraq remains and will be
the source of tension in the future.
Some "hawks" in the US have attacked the recent agreements because, according to them, the Iraqi
state lost its rights to national independence when it was defeated in the Gulf War and that any
negotiations with Saddam Hussein's government are unnecessary and illegitimate concessions to a
"mass murderer" and weak-willed world opinion. The Iraqi Army's invasion of Kuwait was unjust, they
claim, and its defeat gave the victors (the US-lead UN coalition) the right to punish the guilty
state at will. But we must remember that defeat in an unjust war does not give the victor such
automatic rights. For example, the US military's unjust invasion (replete with chemical weapons) of
Vietnam was defeated. But this defeat did not give the Vietnamese government even the theoretical
right to control the US's political and economic life. For the US, defeat was conditional. Similarly,
the Iraqi state's defeat in the Gulf War by the US-lead UN coalition was conditional. Iraq 1991
was not Japan 1945. The Baath government survived the Gulf War and today is defending the principle
of Iraqi sovereignty and the right of the Iraqi state to determine a national industrial policy.
That is, the status of Iraq is not that of a slave whose life was forfeited and must then live
under the absolute legal and moral power of a master, as occurred in Japan after the Second World War.
Iraqi society and its state demand recognition as agents in an exchange.
Nevertheless, the US government insists that any demand by the Iraqi government for negotiations
about the conditions of the accords and the end of sanctions - conditions involving its territory
and economy -are illegitimate. The Clinton Administration is making claims fit for an absolute
master without having any right to possession, except for its military superiority. It is by virtue
of this military power that the US government and its transnational corporate allies have in recent
times battered down all trade and political barriers wherever they stood in the way of US national
and corporate interests. The recent showdown with Iraq was not different, even if the
justifications given appealed to the well-being of the people of the world and put the US in the place of the
ancient knight fighting the horrendous dragon, ensuring in the end that justice is done.
But is hard to cast President Clinton, the supporter of the IMF, NAFTA, Multinational Agreement on
Investment (MAI) and all the other corporate-sponsored institutions and deals around the planet,
in the clothes of Saint George, with his spear drawn in defense of the poor and weak. Indeed, there
were and are more mundane reasons revolving around the price and availability of crude oil that
make war with Iraq a continual temptation .
The Oil Secret
"Most likely the sanctions will be lifted, not when Iraq agrees to any new elimination of a
weapons system or a new inspection of its arms sites, but when it agrees to sell the oil on the US/UN
terms." Midnight Notes 1992: 49
Oil has long been recognized as a major factor in the Gulf War. This insight was expressed most
graphically in the 1990/91 anti-Gulf War movement's slogan "NO BLOOD FOR OIL!" What exact role oil
played then, however, was often disputed. According to some commentators at the time, the US's
interest in "cheap oil" brought about a confrontation with Iraq. But the US government was never
committed to any particular price for crude oil. In 1974, for example, the US government gave the
go-ahead to the Saudis to hike the price of oil dramatically while in 1986 it bombed Libya and sent
cakes to Iran in order to lower the price of oil. (Midnight Notes 1992: 6-7, 283-301) The US was
responding not to the Iraqi state's demand for high oil prices, but to its desperate attempt to bypass
the US military and economic control of Persian Gulf oil in 1990/91. In this respect little has
changed since the Gulf War.
A key to understanding the present situation is to realize that the Iraqi government has managed
to face seven years of total military surveillance and economic sanctions without capitulating
completely to the military subordination and economic dependence that US has demanded of the states in
the region. The Iraqi state is still insisting on some control over the nation's resources and its
independent entrance as a seller into the global oil market. For example, the Iraqi state has made
major deals with a number of non-US oil companies to bring them into the joint development of oil
fields in Iraq once the sanctions are lifted. These deals involve French companies like Elf
Aquitaine and Total SA (involving fields of 12.5 billion barrels) and Russian companies like Lukoil,
Zabrubezneft and Mashinoimport (involving fields of 7.5 billion barrels). The only companies left out
of the oil exploration bonanza when sanctions are lifted will be US-based, unless the Saddam
Hussein regime is somehow persuaded otherwise. (Wall Street Journal 2/23/98: A17)
The economic situation now is the inverse of what it was during the 1991 Gulf War. In 1990, Iraqi
authorities were the primary oil price hawks in OPEC. They were calling for $25 per barrel and one
of their official reasons de guerre was that Kuwait was violating its OPEC quota and depressing
the price of oil. In 1998 Iraq was objectively not a force for higher oil prices. In fact, the full
return of Iraqi oil into the international oil market would substantially lower oil prices. In
1994, the Clinton Administration estimated that, with the full lifting of sanctions, a return of
Iraqi oil on the world market would depress prices by almost 50% and there is no reason to believe
that this estimate does not hold any longer today. Such a price collapse would be especially
problematic for the world petroleum corporations in a period when they believe that there are new,
profitable large-scale investments to be made in oil exploration and development (especially in the
former non-Russian Soviet republics), but at the same time they face a decline in short-term demand
because of the "Asian Crisis" (Beck 1998). Such a price collapse would also undermine the present
control structure of OPEC (where Saudi Arabia, a US client state, is king-pin), and would devastate
the capitalists of the local "oil patch" in Texas and Louisiana. These are no small losers in the
short-run, and they have tremendous power with the US government.
It is important to review oil price politics since the Gulf War to understand this issue. That war
itself was a $4 war because one of the crucial issues at stake was the price of oil in the 1990s.
A desperate Iraqi government, trying to rebuild after the Iraq-Iran war and full of political
debts to its populace, was demanding a $25 per barrel price target at the last OPEC meeting before the
war while the Saudi Arabian regime, with US support, was demanding $21 -a $4 difference. The
Baath regime in 1990 was desperate because it was caught in a pincer. On the one side, the Iraqi
proletariat, after nearly a decade of war with Iran, was demanding a "pay off" in the form of higher
living standards, on the other side, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the US, and the UN were
demanding the privatization of state industries and an end to subsidies, i.e., the imposition of a
policy of austerity and structural adjustment. The invasion of Kuwait was a calculated risk meant
to gain some breathing space from both the Iraqi working class and the IMF/US/UN (by gaining
concessions from the Kuwaitis and other elements of Middle Eastern capital in exchange for a pull
back). The invasion was also premised on the US not having an viable political alternative to the Baath
party. In a way, the invasion did save the Baath regime and did impose austerity on the Iraqi
people.
The Saudi Arabians won the oil price debate with Iraq both at the last OPEC meeting before the
Gulf War and in reality. The price of oil on the international market between 1992 and early 1997
averaged in the region of $19-$20 (with the low at $14 in late 1993 and a high of $25 in early 1997).
Indeed, in 1996 the price was rising rapidly, to the point where many were wondering whether the
pre-Gulf War oil experts' predictions of $40 oil at the beginning of the next century might still
be fulfilled.
But then came, after many twists of fate, the "oil-for-food" agreement between the Iraqi
government and the UN Security Council (Resolution 986) and with it the very regulated and restricted
return of Iraqi oil onto the world market in January 7, 1997 which lead to a dramatic collapse of the
price of oil. In two months (January-March) it fell from $24 to $18 and a year later it is in the
$15-$16 range (it was $16.18 on Feb. 20, 1998, for example).
The US fought against the "oil-for-food" deal diplomatically and militarily. Indeed, the last US
attack on Iraq -the launching of 27 cruise missiles on September 9, 1996 -delayed the
implementation of the Resolution for almost four months. Though it could not stop the "oil-for-food" deal
completely, US diplomats have crafted the resolution in a very restrictive way, making it vulnerable
to a thousand and one possible interruptions and challenges. First, it only allowed for the sale
of about 700,000 barrels per day or only 20% of the 3,500,000 barrels per day the Iraqi state was
exporting before the Gulf War. Second, an essential part of the agreement is the placing of 151
monitors from the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) throughout Iraq who observe whether
the food bought from the oil revenues is properly distributed through an agreed upon ration card
system at more than 60,000 retailers throughout the country. Third, along with food, essential
technology to repair water and sewerage systems as well as equipment for the oil industry may be
purchased with the oil money. These imports will to be checked by a monitoring team as well.
Consequently, the Iraqi economy is not only watched by satellite, spy plane over flights, and the UNSCOM
inspectors; hundreds of accountants and market inspectors are also auditing it daily.
These monitoring teams are clearly more important for the fate of the Iraqi people and state than
the UNSCOM inspection teams, but they are not often talked about in Clinton administration press
conferences. If they are removed from Iraq or cannot do their work there, the "oil-for-food" deal
will become null-and-void and the Iraqi right to sell oil openly will be rescinded.(3) In effect,
any time the US bangs the "drums of war," Iraqi oil is driven out of the market. This is certainly
one of the secret motivations for US war threats, since they permit control over Iraqi oil sales
in the short-run. For example, the UN Security Council increased Iraq's quota for exporting oil
from $2 billion to $5.2 billion on February 20, 1998 as an inducement to Saddam Hussein's government
to sign the new interpretation of the accords in Baghdad. This increase permitted the Iraqi
national oil company to sell up to about 50% of its pre-Gulf War exports. But this limit is purely
theoretical, because
- the UNDHA inspection teams must be operating on the ground in Iraq and
- parts must be imported in order to repair oil extraction and pipeline equipment in order for
the Iraqi National Oil Company to be able to increase production to meet this limit. If the US
threatens war again or objects that some imported piece of equipment can be used to construct a weapon
of mass destruction, the Iraqi's will find themselves either thrown out of the market or unable to
enter into it
Geology and the Oil Producing Proletariat
Ian Chambers, director of the Office for Central America of the International Labour Organisation
(of the United Nations), declared that the indigenous population of the world, estimated at 300
million, live in zones which have 60% of the natural resources of the planet.
Therefore the "MULTIPLE CONFLICTS DUE TO THE USE AND FINAL DESTINATION OF THEIR LANDS AS DETERMINED BY THE INTEREST OF GOVERNMENTS AND COMPANIES IS NOT SURPRISING ... THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES (OIL AND MINERALS) AND TOURISM ARE THE PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIES WHICH THREATEN INDIGENOUS
TERRITORIES IN AMERICA" - Subcommendante Marcos 1997. (interview with Martha Garcia in La Jornada, May 28, 1997) Behind the investment projects comes the pollution, prostitution and drugs. In other words, the
reconstruction/reorganization of the destruction/depopulation of the zone.
The Iraqi people are not the only intended targets of the threatened smart bombs. As in the
previous Gulf War, all people around the world involved in the production of oil and not totally
subservient to the plans of major oil companies and their US and British governmental allies are also
targeted.
In the previous Gulf War this was obvious, but the political situation of this oil producing
proletariat is now different. In the late 1980s and early 1990s workers from Trinidad to Algeria to
Nigeria to the Middle East were in revolt against austerity and structural adjustment policies
imposed by the IMF and WB (Ryan 1991; Midnight Notes 1992; Ihonbvere 1992; Walton and Seddon 1994). They
refused to starve while knowing that the most vital commodity on the planet was being extracted
from their land in front of their eyes without equivalent. They were also inspired by the intifada
which made it clear that a people's revolt cannot be stopped by even the most technologically
advanced oppressor. This revolt was centered in the cities (from Port of Spain, to Algiers, to Lagos,
to Gaza) and the revolutionaries' demands were centered on their governments and the IMF. At the
center of this international intifada against austerity were the immigrant workers in the Middle
East (especially the Palestinians, but also the Egyptians and Yemanis), for they threatened to upset
the despotic regimes the US government still sees as its most important allies and were important
stockholders in the IMF.
The Gulf War forced a total change in the composition of the workforce in the Middle East. The
Palestinian, Yemini and Egyptian workers were expelled and along with them the threat of their
demands for political recognition in the states like Kuwait and the United Arab Emirants where they
comprised the majority of inhabitants. Similar defeats occurred elsewhere, e.g., the anti-IMF movement
in Algeria has been replaced by fundamentalist armed groups exterminating whole towns and the
Palestinian intifada has been rigidified into the PLO's precarious control of a quasi-state in the
West Bank and Gaza. Consequently, the sources of insurgency the Gulf War was directed towards are not
to be found in the same places.
The oil proletariat's revolt since the early 1990s has moved out of the cities and into the
countryside, e.g., in Chiapas in Mexico, in Ogoniland in Nigeria, in Chechenya in Russia, and in the
Caspian region. (Cecena and Barreda 1995) These people are demanding a return for the suffering that
oil exploration and extraction has and will impose on them. They are beginning to put formidable
roadblocks to the oil industry's desperate advance to the last remaining oil areas of the planet .
Shell, Chevron, and Mobil are confronting "those who have
been left behind," the indigenous, the
marginal. These are people that the Zapatista Subcommendate Marcos speaks of when he refers to the
protagonists of a "Fourth World War". They are confronting the soldiers of their own governments as well as the death squads of the transnational companies anxious to get at the oil beneath them
at any cost. (Subcommendante Marcos 1997) They are the people who are living on top of the most
important commodity in the world and who must be displaced and humiliated in order to make its
extraction profitable.
These people, who have been living on the "margins" of industrial development, have been forced to
become protagonists in a new world war because of the growing scientific consensus that world oil
production will peak in the next decade or two. Oil companies are now desperately trying to
position themselves to be able to stake out and possess the remaining oil areas on the planet which
invariably are in regions that had previously been undeveloped. According to this reasoning, if the
companies do not make their claims now, they will be left out of the price boom in the first half of
the 21st century caused by a decline in production and an increase in demand.
This consensus is based on the work M. King Hubbert in the 1950s who accurately predicted that US
non-Alaskan oil production would peak in 1969. Extrapolating Hubbert's work on the US to the whole
planet, geologists like Colin Campbell, Jean H. Laherrere and Craig Bond Hatfield have noted that
the number and size of new oil discoveries have been falling since the 1960s and are rapidly
heading to zero. (Campbell and Laherrere 1998; Hatfield 1997; Hartshorn 1993: 225-251) They also note
that the larger fields are usually found first, while there are diminishing returns on new
exploratory wells in the late period. Since oil consumption is growing at approximately 2 percent per
year, while the old oil fields are drying up and new fields are expensive to find and exploit as well
as being objectively rare, a price hike of dramatic proportions looms.
It follows that all the new profit to be made out of oil production now lies in the geographical
margins of the planet. But it is exactly in this drive to the margins, all the horrors of the
primitive period of the oil industry are returning. Indigenous people must be driven from their lands;
previously uncontaminated waters and lands must be polluted; cultures, peoples and ecologies must
be exterminated. But these peoples are resisting their extermination and are receiving the support
of the world, from the Chiapans to the Ogonis to the Papuans, and are stalling the final advance
of the oil industry.
The US's ongoing threat to bomb of Baghdad at the slightest hint of resistance makes it clear that
any people that does not accept the recolonization of the oil fields by the international oil
companies and their US and British government allies will likely suffer attack. As Secretary Cohen
paradoxically suggests, the Iraqi people have become the objects of military assault because they
have not overthrown the Baath regime and on top of that would not accept the recolonization of their
country the US promises. This places them in the same position as the Zapatistas in Mexico and the
Ogoni in Nigeria.
The Gulf War and Globalization
All the imagery used in the Gulf War to demonize the Iraqi state is now being recycled to create
the impression that the US government is acting against Iraq in response to the exceptional evil
Saddam Hussein embodies. But this planned attack is in line with the policy the US government has
pursued throughout the 1980s and 1990s under the guise of
"globalizaton" in every region of the world.
In African and Latin American countries. globalization-which is premised on the total control of
the world's resources by transnational corporations -requires low-intensity warfare, i.e., the
use of lightly armed groups (from death squads to "contras")
whose aim is not to militarily defeat
the opponent, but to starve and terrorize a resisting population that supports the opponent. We
have seen its application in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mozambique and Angola. In Iraq, instead, the
dictates of globalization seem to call for a very high tech war. But the logic is the same.
The US prosecution of the Iraq war is best understood as the contemporary equivalent of the
British empire's Opium War against China mid-19th century. The British saw their war as a crusade for
"free trade" and their major war objective was to break down the Chinese government's perfectly
reasonable (but "protectionist") resistance to opening up its market to opium produced in the British
colony of India. (Rowling 1987: 80-84) At stake in Iraq is the right of the US government to
control the resources of the planet according to its desires as long as it presents itself as the
uniform of an international agency, be it the UN, the IMF, the WTO or the WHO. This is the late 20th
century version of an appeal to the "natural law" of nations in the past that allowed propagandists
like John Locke to justify the colonization of the Americas in the 17th century. (Arneil 1996)
This is the message the planned war conveys and not to the Saddam Hussein regime alone.
The Russian government is also deeply concerned, as indicated by Yeltsin's remark that a US attack
on Iraq could trigger "World War III". (NYT 2/5/98)
The planned attack on Iraq is an attack on its
future as well -it puts an end to the hope that the Russian state and capital may draw some
benefit from liberalization and that the oil resources of the previous Soviet Union will not be
monopolized by US and English oil companies. With the intensification of its strategy of tension, the US
state is telling its Russian colleagues that their management of oil resources must comply with
the its schemes or else.
The planned attack also sends a message to Asian governments. In fact, there is a deep relation
between Iraq and Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and South Korea. For all these states have tried to
a nation-state model of capitalist development in the 1970s and 1980s. The Asian attempt proved
tremendously successful capitalistically in the 1980s and appeared to be an alternative development
model for previously colonized countries. But this alternative was thrown into crisis this last
year. In this case too, the US response to the crisis is to demand the right of absolute
surveillance. Just as the Iraqis have to show the US government every secret nook in the country, similarly
the Thais, Indonesians and Koreans have to "open up their books" to show the IMF (backed by the US government) all their dealings and, of course, gain their approval in order to survive.
The US government is proposing a global Panopticon ("all seeing") regime, where everything that
occurs on the planet has to been seen, controlled and approved by the US government (or its
representatives in an international agency it controls). Thus, the US is not only aiming to be the
"cop" of the world, as it did in the 1960s, but at the dawn of the 21st century it aspires to be the "investigator," "warden" and "executioner" of the "world" as well.
On the most general level, the issue at stake in the Gulf War is the possibility of any
nation-state charting a sovereign path to its existence and of a people to actively (or even passively)
resist the dictates of the world market (as roughly guided by the US government and its supranational
proxies). This logic can be seen working not only in the case of former colonial countries. It
also applies to "advanced capitalist countries"
as well. Consider the case of the joy-riding US pilot
who killed 20 people in Italy recently when the tail of his fighter cut the cable of the sky-lift
they were on while he was trying to fly under it. The Italian authorities who came to investigate
the plane at its home base in northern Italy were turned away by the US military police and told
that this was an internal US military matter. When the Italians asked for an explanation of the
catastrophe, the US government claimed that it used only its own maps, not the maps of the country
the military is stationed in, even if the local maps are better and more clearly marked features
like the ski lift! The US's imperial gaze only sees war in any attempt to keep a secret from it,
while its own secrets become divine maxims available only to the blessed.
Our question is: how long will those of us in the US go along with this program for eternal war?
Can we call ourselves what Frantz Fanon called the French people during the Algerian War,
"Sleeping Beauty"? Can we let Sleeping Beauty still sleep, while the rivers of blood shed in our name are rising?
Conclusion
Let me end with a summary of my argument and its implications for those who want to resist a new
Gulf War:
First: The threatened bombs over Iraq are aimed at the workers there, because even the threat of an attack will cause the UN to pull out the "oil-for-food" inspection teams and bringing the sale of Iraqi oil to an end. The bombs might kill thousands, but the continuation of sanctions will kill
millions. The Clinton regime is acting as a genocidal God who plays with the lives of millions at
the slightest turn of the political wind. Any people who let monstrous things to be done in their
name to others, should not be surprised that this monster will turn upon them.
Second: The Clinton Administration's strategy of tension is aimed at the control of the world oil market for the interests of the major oil companies and its allies in the Middle East. The US
goverment demands that anyone who will trade in that market must accept its conditions. At the moment
its strategy is the stabilizing and/or increasing the price of oil while forcing the privatization
of nationalized oil companies throughout the planet. But the Iraqi government has refused to
privatize its oil production and its entrance on to the market will severely depress the price of oil.
Consequently, US troops have become the world market's guards, opening up an endless string of
wars, of low, medium and high intensity to protect profits and market shares. [4]
Third: If you believe that the New Economic Order, often called Globalization, is a threat to your
well being, then you should oppose the Clinton Administration's strategy of tension and war
threats. (Midnight Notes 1997) For the war is being planned to threaten all those who refuse
Globalization, i.e., those who refuse to sell their nation's geological patrimony for a song or to sell
themselves for next to nothing to transnational corporations and their supranational allies (the IMF,
WB and WTO).
Envoi
The Clinton Administration aimed to frighten us by giving us nightmares about the secrets of
Baghdad. The Bush Administration seek to do the same. But it might be wise to remember the Rumi poem
that provided this piece with its opening epigraph. The person speaking in the poem is a spendthrift
from Baghdad who dreamed that there was a secret treasure buried under so-and-so's house on
such-and-such street in Cairo. On the basis of this dream, he traveled to Cairo. After many
misadventures, he arrived at night in rags and tried to find the house with the secret treasure. It just so
happened that Cairo was going through a law-and-order craze and everyone found on the street at
night without an explanation was to be arrested as a thief. As the epigraph says, he told his tale to
a patrolman who was on the verge of taking him to jail. The patrolman was moved to tears not only
because of the truth of the story. He too had a dream of a secret treasure; but this treasure was
in Baghdad buried in so-and-so's house on such-and-such street. Once the patrolman said the name
of the owner and the name of street, the seeker realized that his own house and his own street was
the location of the secret treasure.
So it came quietly to the seeker, though he didn't say it out loud, "What I'm longing for lived in my house in Baghdad!"
But the same insight applies to secret horrors as well as to secret treasures: though you look for
them elsewhere, exhausting yourself and your resources, they are in your own home! Stop the war!
End the sanctions!