I write this essay to participate in a discussion within the antiglobalization movement on the events of September 11. I am anguished about the lives lost in the bombings of that day. I am also concerned about the scenario that is in front of us:

♦    The massive bombing of Afghanistan and possible protracted warfare against a list of countries (perhaps sixty, according to President Bush) presumably supporting terrorism or lodging terrorists.

♦    The escalation of xenophobia especially against Arabs, but targeting all immigrants, and this not just in the US. In Italy the Northern League (part of the coalition of parties that now govern the country) has already proposed that all undocumented workers should be treated as potential terrorists.

♦    The demonization of the anti-globalization movement, accused of being an enemy of "western civilization."

♦    New, wide-spread restrictions on civil liberties.

What can we do in this situation? Our first task is obviously to stop the escalation of violence, and mobilize against a US-led war on Afghanistan or any other country the Bush administration picks to be a target for its "war" on "terrorism." We also need to build solidarity with the Arab and immigrant communities in the US now under attack physically and ideologically.

But these generalized responses, however correct, are not enough. We must gain a better understanding of what has happened and why, since any confusion on this point can have the most serious consequences for the antiglobalization movement. For the Bush administration is determined to use the hijackings and mass murders of September 11 as a political opportunity to transform the definition of dissent here in the US and to project the US military into the oil-rich former republics of Soviet Central Asia. A purely generalized politics is doomed to taking a reactive stance in this historical situation, even when the Bush administration's contradictions begin to unravel in the next few weeks.

This essay is inevitably going to be tentative and hypothetical, given our present lack of precise knowledge concerning the details of the crimes - even now, three weeks after September 11, there is public confusion as to the identities of some of the immediate perpetrators. Also, my aim is classification and explanation, but not vilification. The legal and moral facts are enough. The killings of September 11 constituted one of the worst one-day massacres in the last decade, probably only those in the first days of the Rwandan genocide of the Tutsis can rival it in terms of numbers. The thousands of murders are a major crime against humanity and, though the immediate perpetrators are dead, their accomplices, if they had any, should be captured and prosecuted in the appropriate courts without the US government committing similar crimes against the humanity of other countries. That this last proposition is a matter of controversy in the US at this moment shows how perilous are the times we are in!

Oil, Globalization, and Islamic Fundamentalism

On a broad level, the events of September 11, 2001 can be traced back to the economic, social, and cultural crisis that has developed in North Africa, the Middle East, and West Asia in the aftermath of the Gulf War and, prior to it, the accelerating process of globalization, starting in the late 1970s. [footnote 1] The first aspect of this crisis has been the impoverishment of urban workers and agriculturalists in this area, due to Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and import liberalization, dating back to Egypt's "open door" policy that cost the life of Anwar Sadat and saw the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism as a new political force. [footnote 2] From the Cairo "bread riots" of 1976, to the uprisings in Morocco and Algeria of 1988, both crushed in blood baths, to the more recent anti-IMF riots in Jordan (and the list is much longer) the difficulties of merely staying alive for workers has become more and more dramatic, causing major splits within the capitalist classes from Morocco to Pakistan as to how to deal with this rebellion from below (Midnight Notes, 1992).

A further element of crisis has been the situation in Palestine. This too was made more intense by the Gulf War and Israel's response to Palestinian demands with more settlements, the attempted usurpation of Jerusalem, and escalating repression. Regardless of their actual disposition towards the Palestinians, this situation has become a cause of great embarrassment for these ruling classes, revealing, as it does, their duplicity and the shallowness of their commitment to Islamic solidarity.

But the most important factor of crisis has been the hegemonic role of the US in the region, as exemplified by the devastation of Iraq, the US government's proprietary relationship to the management of oil resources in the Middle East, and the building of US bases right in Saudi Arabia, Islam's most sacred land. On all these counts, deep divisions have developed within these ruling classes pitting pro-American governments - often consisting of royal dynasties in the Arabian Peninsula - against a new generation of dissidents within their own ranks. These dissidents, in the name of the Koran, have accused them of being corrupt, of squandering the region's resources, of selling out to the US, of having betrayed Islam. At the same time they have offered an alternative "social contract" to the working classes of North Africa, the Middle East and West Asia and used their wealth to create a multinational network of groups that have stretched through every continent and often taken on a life of their own.

As a social program, Islamic fundamentalism has distinguished itself, in addition to its unmitigated bolstering of patriarchal rule, for its attempt to win over the urban populations through the provision of some basic necessities such as schooling, healthcare, and a minimum of social assistance. These initiatives were often undertaken in response to the ending of government subsidies and programs in these areas which was dictated by Structural Adjustment Programs designed by neoliberals in the World Bank and IMF. [footnote 3] Thus, for example, it is the Islamic fundamentalist networks that organize health care and education in the Palestinian "territories," almost functioning as an alternative government to the PLO at the grassroots level. [footnote 4]

Over the last decade crisis in the Middle East and internationally has intensified. At the same time, so has the antagonism of the Islamic fundamentalist networks against the US and its domestic supporters in the different Islamic countries. But this conflict has been stalemated in key countries in the 1990s.

In Algeria, for example, the Islamic Salvation Front, which grew rapidly after the anti-SAP riots of 1988 and almost took state power electorally in 1991, was stopped by a military coup. For the last decade, through a horrendous civil war where between 60,000 to 70,000 were killed, the Algerian Islamic fundamentalists have been decisively weakened by attrition and military repression.

In Egypt, the Mubarak regime has used direct repression as in Algeria as well a system of microscopic social surveillance. For "the [Mubarak] government acted to stem the proliferation of private mosques and associated charitable foundations and to end their extragovernmental autonomy" (Faksh 1997: 54). The result has been a major defeat of the fundamentalism in, perhaps, the second most important Islamic state.

These setbacks have not been dramatically reversed by fundamentalists seizing state power in Sudan and Afghanistan, for in both countries they inherited, and have not been able to end, long-standing civil wars. But stalemate does not mean defeat, and there is no doubt that Islamic fundamentalism continues to have an attraction within the ruling circles of the wealthiest Islamic nations. This internal contradiction has created a tangled net of consequences which are now embarrassing and endangering many people in the US government and in the governments of the Middle East.

For it is they that have financed and trained the very generation of dissidents who are now so violently turning against them. On the one side, a portion of the Middle Eastern oil revenues has been used to finance assaults on symbols of the New World Order, because of the divided loyalties of the Middle Eastern ruling classes; on the other, the US government has financed and trained many members of this dissident branch of the Middle Eastern ruling classes in its effort to destablize the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The governmental and informal financial and military support of armed Islamic fundamentalists did not end with the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan in 1989. These militants played important economic, military and ideological roles that forwarded US policy against Yugoslavia (in Bosnia and Kosovo) and against Russia (in Chechnya, Dagestan, Uzbekistan) up until September 10, 2001. The deal apparently was: do the dirty work of fighting and destabilizing secular communist, socialist and nationalist regimes in Eastern Europe, Caucasia and Central Asia and you will get rewarded.

These "free floating" militants did the US's dirty work for twenty years, but they obviously increasingly were convinced that the US had not delivered. They were not given their proper reward: taking power at the center of the Islamic world, the Arabian Peninsula.

This complicity and deal-making is why, perhaps, the Bush administration is so hesitant to do what would be natural after such a massive intelligence and security failure attested to by the September 11 crimes: get rid of the incompetents. That would be difficult, for many of those who have been brought back in power into George W. Bush's administration were the ones who were responsible, during his father's presidency, for the training and financing of the very organizations they now hunt under the banner of "terrorism." Therefore, the executive dynasties in both the US and Saudi Arabia must be worried about "family members" who have been compromised by their past connections to the networks they now claim to be responsible for the events of September 11.

This goes up to the President's family. For example, the Wall Street Journal (9/28/01) reported that the President's father works for the bin Laden family business in Saudi Arabia through the Carlyle Group, an international consulting firm, as do other close associates of the President, like former Secretary of State James Baker. The crude and desperate attempts by ideologists of the Bush administration to somehow connect, in ever more arcane ways, the antiglobalization movement with the Islamic fundamentalists is fuelled by desire to distract public attention and hide a real anxiety on its side which is summed up in the question: when will the long list of real connections between the "terrorist network" the Bush administration is hunting and its own personnel be revealed? That is why, perhaps, President Bush harkened back to his childhood memories of "Wanted Dead or Alive Posters" (with the emphasis on "DEAD") when speaking of Osama bin Ladin and his associates. For the administration's legitimacy would be undermined, if they ever spoke the truth.

Why now and why so desperate?

These generalized facts concerning the hidden civil war within the oil-producing countries, from Algeria to Iran, serve to contextualize the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. For I am assuming that the immediate perpetrators of the attacks were committed to some branch of Islamic fundamentalism.

But these facts do not help us understand why the attacks took place in September 2001 and why the resistance to the US took such a desperate form.

For these attacks are symptoms of desperation, not of power, as they will likely lead to a devastating US military response with predictable results: the destruction of thousands of Islamic fundamentalist militants along with a tremendous collateral damage on the people of Afghanistan and many other countries in North Africa, the Middle East and West Asia. Who on the ground can survive in such a maelstrom? Indeed, the actual perpetrators and their accomplices, whoever they are, must have been very desperate to take such a risk with their own network and the lives of millions of people of the region.

It is also probable that many (perhaps most) people even in the most militant Islamic fundamentalist circles object to the bombings in New York and Washington DC - if not for moral, then simply for strategic reasons. They will know full well that all their hard-fought achievements might go up in smoke as a result these actions. Clearly something very important was in process that the perpetrators of September 11 needed desperate and inherently uncertain measures to thwart. What was it?

If my hypothesis is right, this desperation was rooted in certain events at the geographical center of Islam, Saudi Arabia - events which echoed throughout the Islamic world. My view is that the political factors motivating the mass murder and suicides of September 11 involved the oil industry and globalization in the Arabian Peninsula. Here is the story. Beginning in 1998 (after the collapse of oil prices due to the Asian Financial Crisis), the Saudi monarchy decided, for "strategic reasons," to globalize its economy and society, beginning with the oil sector. The oil industry had been nationalized since 1975, which means that foreign investors were allowed to participate only in "downstream" operations like refining. But in September 1998, Crown Prince Abdullah met with senior executives from several oil companies. According to Gawdat Bahget, when in Washington DC, "The Crown Prince asked the oil companies' executives to submit directly to him recommendations and suggestions about the role their companies could play in the exploration and development of both existing and new oil and gas fields" (Bahget 2001: 5). These "recommendations and suggestions" were then submitted to a Supreme Council for Petroleum and Mineral Affairs in early 2000 (after being vetted by the Crown Prince), and, by mid-2000, the Saudi government began to cautiously respond to them, by ratifying a new foreign investment law.

Under the new law, "tax holidays are abolished in favor of sweeping reductions in tax on profits payable by foreign entities, bringing them nearer to levels that apply to local companies. Wholly owned foreign businesses WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO OWN LAND, sponsor their own employees and benefit from concessionary loans previously available only to Saudi companies" (Bahgat 2001: 6, my emphasis) [Note: it is obvious why "the right to own land" would be a red flag for anyone committed to the sacred character of the Arabian Peninsula.] The Middle Eastern experts were literally falling over themselves in their effort to highlight the new Investment Regulation. One described it in the following words, "Keep your fingers crossed, but it looks as if Saudi Arabia is abandoning almost seventy years of restrictive, even unfriendly policy toward foreign investment" (MacKinnon 2000). This law constituted, in effect, a NAFTA-like agreement between the Saudi monarch and the US and European oil companies.

At the same time as this law was being discussed, a ministerial committee announced that up to $500 billion of new investments would be deployed over the next decade to change the form of the Saudi national economy. $100 billion of this investment was already promised by foreign oil companies. In May of 2001 the first concrete step in this stepped-up globalization process was concluded, when Exxon/Mobil, the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, and eight other foreign companies (including Conoco and Enron from the US) took on a $25 billion natural gas development project in Saudi Arabia. The financial press noted that the deal would not be very lucrative in itself, but that "It's part of a long-term ploy of the oil companies, [which] want ultimately to get access again to Saudi crude" (LA Times 5/19/2001).

Thus, by the Summer of 2001, the Saudi monarchy had cast the die and legally, socially and economically crossed the Rubicon to globalization (but with its "fingers crossed," undoubtedly). It "globalized" not because the Saudi Arabian debt was unmanageable (as was the case with most other countries which bent to the globalizing dictates of the IMF), but because, faced with a intensifying opposition, the King and his circle realized that only with the full backing of the US and European Union could they hope to preserve their rule in the coming years. In other words, confronted with significant social problems, and an insurrectionist element within its own class [that could not be defeated by open confrontation, since it took on the garb of Islam too], the Saudi Arabian government seems to have decided that an overhaul of its economy would defeat its dangerous opposition through attrition and further solidify its alliance with US and European capital. The strategy was aimed at reducing the large and growing unemployment rate among its young citizens, its dependence on oil exports, and its huge foreign labor force (in 1993 there were 4.6 million foreign workers out of a total population of 14.6 million; today they are approximately 6-7 million in a population of about 22-23 million) by "getting the economy moving again." [footnote 5]

This required a radical departure from the clientistic methods of social control the Saudi monarchy had used in the past to keep social peace, which was made possible until recently by its immense oil wealth. But this wealth is not infinite, and indeed has been declining - per capita GNP fell from approximately $13,000 to $8,000 from 1983 to 1993, and continues to fall (Cordesman 1997: 64).

Inevitably, this initiative would impact the economic policies of the other oil-producing governments in the region, especially the Gulf Cooperation Council states - Oman, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait. If it works, this strategy would deal a decisive blow to the Islamicist opposition, undermining its ability to recruit converts who would be employed in the upper echelons of a "globalized economy and society" instead of being driven to despair by political powerlessness and long periods of unemployment.

But the introduction of foreign ownership of land and natural resources, backed up by large investments, and the hiring of more expatriates >from Europe and the US, would force a major social change. [footnote 6] The cat-and-mouse game that the Saudi monarchy had played with the fundamentalist dissidents (in which the King and his dynasty claimed to be even more fundamentalist than them) would end. Whatever hopes the Islamic opposition in the ruling classes of the Arabian Peninsula had ever harbored of getting their governments to send the American troops packing and turning their oil revenues into the economic engine of a resurgent Islam were facing a historic crisis in the summer of 2001. Without a major reversal, the Islamic fundamentalist opposition would have to face the prospect of a total civil war in their own countries, or face extinction.

Certain elements [individuals or groups, we do not yet know] of this opposition decided that only a spectacular action, like the September 11 hijackings and the destruction of thousands of people in New York and Washington, could turn back the tide. Perhaps they hope that, if enough turmoil and uncertainty can be generated by the attacks in the US, they will generate a strategic US retreat from the Arabian Peninsula, just as the bombing in Lebanon in 1983 lead the US to pull out there. We could speculate whether the election of the George W. Bush administration accelerated the timing of the attack. In the eyes of the world it represents a government not ready to make any sort of concession, a government even more likely than the one preceding it to claim possession of minerals in the Middle East subsoil, a government ready to break all treaties, to allow Israel to have its way in Palestine, and so forth.

On the basis of this analysis, the September 11 attacks on New York City and Washington DC were the "collateral damage" of a struggle over the fate of oil politics in the Arabian Peninsula. In order to test this hypothesis perhaps we should investigate developments in the Peninsula over the coming weeks, developments which will undoubtedly be hidden from sight, rather than the sound and fury that will be directed towards Afghanistan for more obvious reasons.

The Bush Reaction:

A "War" on "Terrorism" and the US Military Penetration of Central Asia

It is important that we understand the political and economic aims of the hijackers and their accomplices, but it will be even more important for us to be clear about the Bush administration's agenda. For one need not indulge in conspiracy theories to recognize that the Bush administration will use the events of September 11 as best as it can to forward its own foreign poloicy agenda (while acknowledging that the shock of the destruction of lives and property on that day has profoundly destabilized President Bush's domestic economic and social agenda).

The Bush administration has clearly used the death and destruction of September 11 as a platform to furthering the adminstration's agenda in two territories:

1. the former Central Asian republics of the U.S.S.R. and the former and present Caucasian republics

   The Bush administration seeks a conceptual restructuring of the political horizon and a geo-political thrust into the former Central Asian republics of the U.S.S.R., which became nation states in 1991. These states, especially Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, have significant oil and gas reserves. "The proven and possible energy reserves in or adjacent to the Caspian region - including at least 115 billion barrels of oil - are in fact many times greater than those of the North Sea and should increase significantly with continuing exploration. Such plentiful resources could generate huge returns for US companies and their shareholders. American firms have already acquired 75 percent of Kazakhstan's mammoth Tengiz oil field, which is now valued at more than $10 billion." (Kalicki 2001: 121).

   These countries, along with the former and present Caucasian republics, form the southern border of Russia's "Near Abroad", which the US has been aiming to penetrate militarily for some time both for immediate economic purposes and for the ultimate goal of disintegrating Russia itself into a set of pliable statelets. The minute President Bush named Osama bin Ladin as "the prime suspect" and "his" camps in Afghanistan as the training ground for the terrorists that destroyed the Twin Towers, every diplomatic move aimed at setting up forward military bases and fly-over rights to attack bin Ladin also doubles as a tool for the US military occupation of Central Asia itself.

   After all, we are being told unequivocally that bin Ladin is the center of the evil, and that even his capture ("DEAD or alive") will not end the threat of terrorism from that quarter. Therefore, the military campaign against both bin Ladin and terrorism (we are assured) will take months, even years to accomplish. Perhaps the most damaging thing that might happen to this double-edged US government campaign would be for bin Ladin and his circle to depart from the scene while leaving behind a well-documented history of their involvement with the US government over the last twenty years!

   The recognition that this US war against Osama bin Ladin and his supporters in the Taliban government is also a way to realize one of the main post-Communist goals of US foreign policy was immediately apparent to analysts of the oil industry, and to critics of the NATO war in Yugoslavia. The new "Great Game" [a.k.a. "the war for oil and destabilization in Central Asia"] reading of the Bush administration's moves was easily documented, because much of the relevant material required for this interpretation had been researched in 1999 when many were trying to understand the motivations of the Clinton administration's involvement in the war against Yugoslavia above and beyond its ostentatiously decried (and newly found) concern for Kosovars' human rights (cf. for example, Chossudovsky 2001, Federici and Caffentzis 2000, Talbot 2000). It became clear then that one of the reasons the US attacked Yugoslavia (one of the few remaining Russian allies in Europe) was to impress on the Russians that it will use all of its might to discourage them from interfering with its investments in Caucasia and Central Asia.

   It is now a foregone conclusion that anyone interested in understanding Afghan-centered aspects of the Bush administration will have to take into account the "oil factor" (especially given the direct involvement of many members of the Bush administration in the oil companies that are heavily invested in this area.) This is not to say that this geo-political thrust into Central Asia was high on the Bush administration's agenda prior to September 11. The expansion of drilling rights within the US was one of its first oil-related initiatives and preoccupied it throughout the summer of 2001. Indeed, Jan Kalicki, a "point man" in the Clinton administration on Central Asian oil, wrote an article for the September/October 2001 Foreign Affairs complaining about Bush's back sliding in Central Asia. After detailing the Clinton administration's accomplishments, he fretted that they "are now at risk of unravelling due to inadequate attention from the Bush administration and restrictive US policies. In contrast to the Clinton administration's vigorous support of Caspian energy initiatives, the Bush team seems to have placed these issues on the back burner" (Kalicki 2001: 130). Kalicki ended his article with the following words: "For the US to squander its past success and future potential in the region through complacency and inattention would be a serious mistake." He must now be pleased by the swift end of Bush's "complacency and inattention" to Central Asia after September 11, and probably welcomes a return to oil business as usual there.

2. There is another territory that the Bush administration forcefully moved into after September 11 that is more abstract, but perhaps even more important for our movement. It is the territory of words.

   By declaring the piracy, murders and devastation in New York City, Washington DC and Western Pennsylvania on September 11 an "act of war" and the start of its own "war on terrorism," the Bush administration is attempting to restructure the conceptual future of humanity for many years to come. By imposing a false dichotomy - "you must approve my policies or you are on the terrorists' side" - on the moral conscience of the majority of people on the planet [who are stunned, frightened and disgusted by the mass murder of September 11] it hopes to take these consciences hostage, using the thousands dead in New York and Washington as talismans. This moral hocus pocus will fail in the long run, of course, because the overwhelmingly large number of people on this planet do not fit into the "Us vs. Them" model that Bush's war configuration of September 11 requires.

   Most reject, heart and soul, both the futures on offer, whether from capitalist globalization or its desperate Islamic militant opponents. There will be, in the meantime, innumerable attempts by the administration to equate dissent from the Bush policies as complicity in, or condoning of, or indifference to the dead of, September 11. These attempts to intimidate, and to equate dissent with terrorism, will eventually fail, largely due to their own contradictions. We did not have wait too long for these contradictions to reveal themselves. After all, high officials of the Bush administration financed, armed and trained the now decried "terrorist network" of Islamic militants, not the antiglobalization movement!

   Moreover, the semantic strain between Bush's "war" description of September 11, and the "crime and justice" approach favored by other bodies in the US is readily apparent. The "war" concept has immediately run into conflict with the way that these acts are being considered by the relevant authorities - the NYC Police Department, the courts, the insurance companies and the FBI. These acts are being investigated as crimes. Suspects are being questioned, material witnesses who might flee are being kept in prison, the sites of the crashed airliners are being treated as crime scenes and are being searched for evidence.

   The suspects are not classified as prisoners of war, they are being treated as potential criminals with rights to counsel.

   Nor are the insurance companies using their "acts of war" loopholes to stop payment of claims.

   You might say, "Crime or war, is this is not just a semantic quibble?" On the contrary, the way in which these events are described is a "life and death" decision. For the description of an event has implicit in it many moral and practical consequences, some obvious and others unforeseen. There are important differences between crime and war. Thus, a crime is an action done in violation of a state's laws (though not necessarily on its territory) by particular agents. Once a crime has been committed, the sequential consequences of investigation, indictment, apprehension, trial and then, perhaps, conviction and punishment are rather clear and are ruled over by an elaborate set of rules, laws and institutions. Most importantly, this sequence is built to be an inherently finite structure, which might, however, by accident, never come to a conclusion (e.g., when the agent responsible for the crime is never apprehended). That is why it is particularly revealing that the first name of the US government used to refer to its effort to apprehend the accomplices of the hijackers and many other allied terrorists was "Operation Infinite Justice." One of the great virtues of Justice is that it is finite and aims to bring an end to a harm done. Consequently, "infinite" justice can not be justice.

   War, on the other hand, is an inherently infinite structure (what we in the US now call, "open ended," and what one 19th century theorist of war called, "total") which might, however, by accident, come to an end, say, with a peace treaty or the annihilation of one or both of the opposing warring parties. But it need not. Moreover, the rules of prosecuting war are always open to question, since they are largely the result of agreements of states which are not at war but which might, as a matter of defending their sovereignty, use their sovereignty to declare these rules null and void for themselves in the midst of war.

   Why did the high ranking members of the Bush administration choose "war," not "crime," in the hours after the crashes? At first glance this decision might have been rooted in the particular aspects of the events themselves. First, the quantitative dimension of the one-day killing and deliberate property destruction is unprecedented in recent US history. Second, the immediate perpetrators died committing the acts (one wonders what would have been the response if the immediate perpetrators had survived and were on the loose). Their collective suicide opened the logical possibility that they planned September 11 by themselves and that the people who supported them did not even know that they had such an audacious and risky idea in mind. Under these circumstances, if the event was categorized as a crime, then it would be a crime without living culprits - a consequence that could hardly be palatable to many in or out of the Bush administration. Finally, the choice of targets was symbolically aimed at the central economic, military and, if speculation concerning the destination of the fourth plane is accurate, political sites of the U.S.

   The hijackers seemed to think of themselves as heroic warriors striking at the heart of the US and Bush agreed with their self-description. So the spectacular logic of suicide-hijackers was echoed by the Bush administration in its first assessment of these acts as acts of war.

   But there are other, more general reasons, for the Bush administration personnel's choice of words, I believe. They concluded very early on that the hijackers were not some sort of nihilistic group deciding, a la "Fight Club," to go to their deaths in an abstract blaze of glorious horror, and nor were they representatives of the home-grown militia movement (as the perpetrators of the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995 proved to be). Though the September 11 perpetrators left no formal proclamation that accompanied their act, the Bush administration saw that it was a political action on the gameboard of the US government's ongoing struggle against dissidents in Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern nations. This was a struggle that the US had been involved in since the Gulf War, a struggle to keep its military and economic presence in the oil fields of the Arabian Peninsula. Since the word "war" captures the sense of a grand struggle (even though it is normally reserved for confrontations of nations), and since the Bush administration is committed to keeping and/or increasing control of the oil resources of that geographical arc from Saudi Arabia to Kazakhstan, it would be quite natural for them to express themselves in such language in this context (after all, George W. Bush, National Security Advisor Rice and Vice President Chaney were deeply and directly involved in the oil industry in the recent past).

   But perhaps the most important reason for use of the word "war" is that it gives the Bush administration the right to exercise extraordinary powers, both domestically and internationally. Consider how the "war on drugs" has been so effectively used to justify interventions in countries as varied as Colombia, Panama and Afghanistan. Consider staggering legal and penal counter-revolution in the US perpetrated under the banner of the domestic "war on drugs". One hesitates to contemplate what a parallel intensification of an unbounded "war on terrorism" will do to the prison populations and civil liberties of the US.